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Abstract: Understanding probabilities as something other than point values 
(e.g., as intervals) has often been motivated by the need to find more 
realistic models for degree of belief, and in particular the idea that degree of 
belief should have an objective basis in “statistical knowledge of the world.” I 
offer here another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how 
chance evolves as a function of time. If the world is “chancy” in that there are 
non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then the 
chance of an event e that happens at a given time is <1 until it happens. But 
whether the chance of e goes to one continuously or not is left open. 
Discontinuities in such chance trajectories can have surprising and troubling 
consequences for probabilistic analyses of causation and accounts of how 
events occur in time. This, coupled with the compelling evidence for quantum 
discontinuities in chance’s evolution, gives rise to a “(dis)continuity bind” with 
respect to chance probability trajectories. I argue that a viable option for 
circumventing the (dis)continuity bind is to understand the probabilities 
“imprecisely,” that is, as intervals rather than point values. I then develop 
and motivate an alternative kind of continuity appropriate for interval-valued 
chance probability trajectories. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Understanding probabilities as something other than points, 
perhaps as intervals or more general sets, has often been motivated 
by the need to find more realistic models for degree of belief, and in 
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particular the idea that degree of belief should have an objective basis 
in “statistical knowledge of the world” (Kyburg 1999, 2). I offer here 
another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how chance 
evolves as a function of time. If the world is “chancy” in that there are 
non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then 
the chance of an event e that happens at a given time is <1 until it 
happens. But whether the chance of e as a function of time, Pe(t), 
continuously approaches 1 or not is left open. Discontinuities in Pe(t) 
have surprising and troubling consequences for probabilistic analyses 
of causation and our understanding of how events occur in time. This, 
coupled with the compelling evidence for quantum discontinuities in 
chance’s evolution, gives rise to a “(dis)continuity bind” with respect to 
chance probability trajectories. I argue that a viable option for 
circumventing the (dis)continuity bind is to understand the 
probabilities “imprecisely,” that is, as intervals rather than point 
values. 
 
Imprecise (non-point-valued) probability has been studied for 
some time in applied and subjective probability settings, e.g., Walley 
(1991), Kyburg (1999) and Weichselberger (2000), and are of 
renewed interest of late; see Augustin et al. (2014). And most recently 
imprecise probabilities have been extended to objective 
understandings of chance by Glynn (2014). While within the setting of 
point probabilities the pull toward and away from continuity does 
indeed constitute a bind, this is not so in imprecise probability 
settings. 
 
The advantage of interval-valued probability is that the notion of 
a continuous function opens up when the function in question is not a 
point-valued function. It turns out that there are multiple ways to 
generalize the standard (point-valued) definition of continuous. Thus 
one can find kinds of continuity that stabilize causally salient inequality 
claims between probability trajectories without being so restrictive as 
to decide substantive philosophical questions by definition. In 
particular, such kinds of continuity retain the possibility of “jumps” in 
chance to capture quantum or other theoretically motivated 
“discontinuity.” 
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The plan of the paper will be to begin by introducing chance 
probability trajectories and the (dis)continuity bind they give rise to 
(Sects. 2, 3). I then present (Sect. 4) interval-valued trajectories as 
an alternative to point-valued trajectories. Finally, I develop and 
motivate an alternative kind of continuity (Sect. 5), appropriate for 
interval-valued chance trajectories, that I argue alleviates the bind 
(Sect. 6). 
 
2 Chance as a Function of Time: Continuous or 
Discontinuous? 
 
To introduce the continuity question I will present it in a vague 
causal setting, which I will firm up and connect to specific accounts 
below in Sect. 3. Let x and y denote token events, where x takes place 
at time and place (tx, sx) and y takes place at (ty, sy). Suppose further 
in some plausible way that x’s being Xcausedy’s being Y, where x is of 
type X and y is of type Y. The focus for now will be on how the chance 
of token event y’s being Y evolves between tx and ty, that is, how the 
chance of y’s being Y changes as a function of time. (From here on I 
will abbreviate the token events of “x being X” and “y being Y” by just 
writing the properties exemplified, X and Y, respectively.) 
 
It is a starting assumption for what follows that chance be 
understood as a single-case time-dependent probability akin to what 
are sometimes called “physical probabilities.” I begin with the standard 
assumption for such discussions that the chance probability function P 
is part of a probability space triple < Ω, ℱ, 𝑃 >where Ω is a set, ℱ is a σ-
field over Ω, and P is a probability function on F ℱ that obeys the 
standard (Kolmogorov) axioms of the probability calculus. These 
physical probabilities (chances) apply to particular events, ones that 
occur or fail to occur at a particular time and place, and hence have 
values defined relative to a time of evaluation. To make explicit the 
temporal index, t, involved in evaluating the chance of event Y∈ ℱ at 
time t, I use the notation PY(t). Thus in general if an event Y occurs at 
a time ty, PY(t) is strictly between 0 and 1 prior to ty, and 1 at time ty 
and all later times. I will use the terms “chance trajectory” and 
“probability trajectory” interchangeably to refer to chance analyzed in 
terms probability in this way.1 
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I am roughly following Ismael (2011, 419–420) with my pre-
theoretic understanding of chance, taking it to be “...the link between 
the fundamental level of physical description in quantum mechanics 
and the measurement results that mark the points of empirical contact 
between theory and world.” I follow her in that my understanding is 
that chance is objective and non-trivial (not everywhere zero or one), 
though I remain agnostic with respect to her ultimate analysis of it and 
especially whether its grounding is at the quantum level or some 
higher level as in Glynn (2010, 2014) or Sober (2010). 
 
To illustrate a chance probability trajectory further, consider the 
following commonly discussed example originally from Rosen (1978) 
and modified here from Eells (1991): 
 
Example 1 
 
A poorly putted golf ball is rolling roughly in the direction of the cup 
when a squirrel runs by and bumps it in such a way that its resulting 
trajectory is directly toward the cup and it continues right into the cup. 
 
Again, I am assuming that the probability values of PY(t) in this 
example reflect the objective chance of the event (ball going in the 
hole) and that its chance is strictly <1 until it happens. To fill out the 
relevant probabilities in this example, suppose that the probability of 
the ball going into the cup given its initial trajectory, velocity, etc. is 
0.4. Suppose further that, in general, the (type) probability of balls 
going in when squirrels bump them is very low (say 0.05), however, in 
this (token) case the particular trajectory of the ball immediately 
following the bump made the probability of the ball falling in the cup 
likely, say 0.8. Denoting the event of the squirrel bumping the ball as 
x being X and the event of the ball going into the cup as y being Y, we 
can depict the probability trajectory of Y as in the graph in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 
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Chance trajectory with discontinuous jump at occurring event 
 
The usual (intuitive) causal verdict in this example is that the 
squirrel’s kick X caused the ball to drop into the cup Y, even though in 
general squirrel kick’s in such situations almost never result in the ball 
going in the hole. The salient features of the graph for causal 
considerations are that the chance of Y takes an immediate point drop 
in probability at tx, corresponding to the type-level fact that X-type 
events generally decrease the chance of Y-type events, and that the 
chance of Y recovers immediately after the ball is bumped at tx to a 
higher value than it had before because of the favorable 
trajectory/velocity actually imparted by the token event X. While 
hopefully this causal story seems plausible enough, its details are not 
of particular concern here. For present purposes, the important feature 
of the graph is the discontinuity at ty, that is, the fact that the chance 
of Y “jumps” to 1 at moment the ball falls into the cup.2 
 
This “jump” is perhaps a natural way to incorporate the 
assumption that the world is chancy or indeterministic at the macro-
level. This “occurring event discontinuity” assumption is made and 
discussed explicitly in, for example, Eells’ (1991, 294) account of 
singular causation, but the question arises in any setting in which 
probability trajectories and chance are involved. I refer to this 
assumption as 
 
DJP (Discontinuous Jump Principle) The chance trajectory 
of an event e that occurs at te jumps discontinuously to 1 at 
time te. 
 
It is important to note that in order for there to be a 
discontinuous jump (jump discontinuity) as Y occurs (or at any other 
significant time, e.g., tx), it is necessary that the trajectory be 
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continuous in some (perhaps small) interval to the left of the jump 
discontinuity—this will become significant below. 
 
Notice that the assumption that the probability of an event is 
not one until the event occurs is also consistent with the graph 
continuously approaching one. While it may be more natural to require 
the graph to “jump” to one, this “jump” is not entailed by a chance or 
indeterminism assumption.4 Consider the alternate graph of Example 
1 depicted in Fig. 2, in which the chance trajectory continuously 
approaches one at ty. It is equally true in this graph that the 
probability of Y is strictly <1 until it actually occurs at ty. The 
difference between this graph and the graph in Fig. 1 is that in Fig. 1 
the value of PY(t) is bound away from one prior to ty, while in Fig. 2 
the value of PY(t) becomes arbitrarily close to, but always <1 as t 
approaches ty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 
Chance trajectory with continuous chance at occurring event 
 
This question of the continuity of the chance trajectory of an 
occurring event is but one of a host of issues that come up concerning 
the continuity of chance trajectories. In the next section I argue that 
these general continuity issues have no straightforward resolution and 
in fact present something of a bind. 
 
3 The Continuity Bind 
 
In this section I argue that there are compelling reasons both 
for and against the possibility of discontinuities in chance trajectories, 
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and that consequently we are faced with a “continuity bind.” The bind 
arises from the tension between the following three considerations: (1) 
systematic discontinuities in chance trajectories like those required by 
DJP are problematic, but (2) assuming continuous chance trajectories 
runs afoul the compelling evidence for discontinuous chance from 
quantum phenomena, and yet (3) many probabilistic accounts of 
causality depend in one way or another on continuity assumptions. 
 
3.1 Discontinuity Problems 
 
Return now to Example 1. Consider the period from after the 
time the squirrel bumps the ball to the time it enters the cup. The 
instant the ball comes off the bump it has a certain trajectory and 
speed, one that will take it directly into the cup, and this helps make 
the chance of the ball going in as high as it is after that instant. As 
time gets closer to ty and the ball gets closer to the cup, the number of 
eventualities that could prevent the fall into the cup decreases, and 
hence its chance continues to increase. That is, as the ball passes by 
points on the green closer and closer to the cup with the same 
favorable trajectory and speed, the chance of its going in the cup 
would naturally be expected to continue to get closer and closer to 
one. These considerations alone would seem to favor a continuous 
increasing of PY(t) toward one, but there are more compelling reasons 
for rejecting the discontinuous version.5 
 
Suppose that DJP is correct, namely, that the chance 
trajectories for events that occur do jump at the instant they occur. It 
follows then that the chance trajectory for any of the occurring events 
leading up to the event under consideration would also have a jump 
discontinuity at the time at which they occur. It is clear that the 
chance (trajectory) of the original event is not independent of the 
chance (trajectories) of certain of the events leading up to it, i.e., its 
chance depends on those events that need to “fall into place” in order 
for it to happen. And this leads to problems. Consider again Example 
1: between the time of the cause-event tx and the time of the effect-
event ty, both version’s graph (Figs. 1, 2) depict the chance trajectory 
as continuous in the interval just to the left of ty. But this does not 
accord with the “jumpy” nature of the probabilistically (causally) 
relevant prior events falling into place.6 If all the events involved in 
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the ball traversing the points on the green after being bumped and 
before entering the cup have chance trajectories that have a jump 
discontinuity at the time they occur, then it seems that the chance 
trajectory of Y (ball falling into the cup), which depends upon such 
events falling into place, should reflect this discontinuous “jumping” at 
the times these prior events occur in the interval before ty. 
 
This reasoning suggests that the discontinuous version of how 
chance trajectories increase to one is inconsistent with the chance 
trajectory PY(t) being continuous in the interval just before ty, as it 
must be in order to have a jump discontinuity. If this is right, then 
assuming something like DJP in such settings is inconsistent, since 
PY(t) is required (as depicted) to be continuous in at least some small 
interval to the left of ty. The details of the formal argument and 
discussion can be found elsewhere (Peressini forthcoming), so I will 
just sketch it here. It begins by constructing a series of 
probabilistically relevant events “converging” to the time ty, the 
moment Y occurs. Consider a sequence of moments {ti}converging to 
ty and a sequence of events {Xi}occurring at these times and upon 
which Y’s chance (probabilistically) depends: in the setting of Example 
1, these events and moments might be where the ball was (with its 
same favorable trajectory) at half of a second before it went in, and a 
fourth of a second before, an eighth of a second before, .... More 
formally we might put this as 𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑦 −
1
2ⅈ
 and Xi= the event of the ball 
being where it was at ti with the particular favorable trajectory it had.7 
One then makes use of Bayes’ Theorem to formalize how Y’s chance 
trajectory is dependent on the chance trajectories of the Xi. The 
argument takes the form of an inconsistent/incoherent dilemma, 
namely that DJP in this setting entails either that 
 
1. the chance trajectory, PY(t) is discontinuous from the left at ty 
(has no left hand limit), which is inconsistent with there being a 
jump discontinuity at ty, or that 
 
2. the certainty (distance chance is from 1) of antecedent events 
upon which Y depends becomes arbitrarily larger than the 
certainty of Y itself, which will be shown to be an incoherent 
result. 
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The relevant detail for purposes here is that employing a 
discontinuity principle like DJP has the unexpected consequence that 
chance trajectories are radically discontinuous or otherwise incoherent. 
A related result is that employing something parallel to the DJP in 
analyzing causation, i.e., utilizing discontinuous jumps as in the graphs 
of Example 1 whenever causally relevant events fall into place is 
similarly problematic. I will call this causal version of DJP: 
 
CDJP   (Causal Discontinuous Jump Principle) The chance 
trajectory of an event e that occurs at te jumps 
discontinuously at times when events causally relevant to 
e occur. 
 
It should be clear that CDJP runs the risk of the same problems 
as DJP. If a similar construction of a sequence of temporally 
converging probabilistically relevant antecedent events can be found, 
then CDJP will face the same inconsistency/incoherency.8 
 
In summary, while it seems natural in some causal contexts to 
understand the chance of an event as discontinuously “jumping” as its 
cause(s) occur, such discontinuities lead to problems: when jump 
discontinuities are required in general as occurring events occur (DJP) 
or as causally relevant events occur (CDJP), then chance functions will 
suffer from the essential or radical discontinuity problems (or be 
incoherent). But it would be rash to rule out such discontinuity in 
general, since quantum theory so notoriously invokes just such 
irreducible chance. 
 
3.2 Irreducible Quantum Chance 
 
As mentioned above, an obvious way out of the discontinuity 
problem is to understand chance trajectories as everywhere 
continuous, but this runs afoul the very real possibility of irreducible 
quantum “chance,” both at the quantum level and “percolating up” to 
our macro-level. 
 
Quantum events, say the decay of a U-238 atom, may well have 
a non-trivial chance of occurring that does not change through time. If 
so, then at the instant the event occurs, the chance trajectory will 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.] 
10 
 
jump from its constant value to one. See Fig. 3. Such quantum events 
seem to be a singular kind of event that does not depend 
probabilistically (or causally) on any other factors, and hence has a 
chance trajectory that does not “evolve through time” until it jumps to 
1. And while it may be initially tempting to conclude from this that 
such discontinuous behavior is isolated to the quantum-level, this is 
not plausible. Various examples have been developed to show that this 
jumpiness can be made to “percolate up,” even if it does not do so on 
a regular basis. A simple one involves nothing more than a Geiger 
counter that emits a clicking sound (macro-level event) when a micro-
level decay event is detected. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 
The discontinuous chance trajectory of a quantum-level event 
 
 
A possible response might be to maintain that while at the 
quantum-level such quantum events have discontinuous chance 
trajectories, macro-level events that involve them “dampen out” the 
discontinuity. Such a view might insist that events at the macro-level 
always have duration; they consist of intervals of time (and space). If 
so, then the discontinuity is avoided at the macro-level because the 
detection event and/or the ensuing clicking event have temporal 
duration during which the chance of the click (detection event) can 
increase sharply but continuously to 1. But at best, understanding 
macro- and quantum-level chance as distinct kinds such that temporal 
duration at the macro-level “smooths out” the quantum discontinuities, 
saves only macro-level continuity—and at the cost of assuming a 
bifurcated view of chance that involves a significant assumption about 
how empirical theory will ultimately go. Countenancing the possibility 
of discontinuous chance trajectories at all levels seems unavoidable. 
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3.3 Implicit Continuity Needs 
 
How should one understand the continuity of the chance of an 
event as the event occurs? The upshot of Sect. 3.1 is that employing a 
discontinuity principle like DJP or CDJP has the unexpected 
consequence that chance trajectories are radically discontinuous (or 
otherwise incoherent). So accounts of causation like those of Eells 
(1991) that depend on such discontinuities are immediately 
problematic. 
 
But other probabilistic analyses of causation have an opposite 
problem: they depend (at least implicitly) on continuity in the chance 
trajectories. Accounts most obviously affected by continuity are those 
like Menzies (1989), who utilizes “temporally dense” chains of 
(counter-factual) probability increases, and Kvart (2004), whose 
account looks for “stable screeners” and “causal relevance 
neutralizers” in temporally intermediate events between cause and 
effect. If chance cannot be assumed to be continuous, however, this 
undercuts such accounts by rendering the probability in the interval 
potentially unstable in that it may “jump” between values that may or 
may not preserve the presence of the relevant “probability increases” 
or the absence of “stable screeners” (probability decreasers).9 
 
Even in probabilistic accounts of causation that lack explicit 
reference to the evolution of chance through time, there are potential 
complications. For example, in Noordhof (1999), Hitchcock (2004), 
Northcott (2010) and Glynn (2011) one finds reference to probabilities 
(and probability inequalities) assessed “shortly before” the time of the 
cause and/or effect.10 These accounts in one way or another compare 
the probability of an event e before it occurs at time te conditional on 
the presence and absence of a putative cause c at time tc. Depending 
on the details of the account, one evaluates inequalities involving 
conditional probabilities at moments “just before” the time of the 
cause tc−ϵ or “shortly before” the time of effect te−ϵ, and perhaps at 
times in between. But such inequalities are stable, that is, one can 
safely ignore the ϵ>0 magnitude expressed by “just before,” thereby 
assuming that if ϵ is sufficiently small the inequality will hold for all 
smaller, only if the probability functions are continuous to the left of tc 
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or te. In general, when an inequality of the form Pt−ϵ(e|c)>Pt−ϵ(e|∼c) is 
employed as it is in these accounts, its stability is dependent in this 
sense on a continuity assumption. 
 
Glynn’s (2011) careful account helps reveal that even when 
utilizing variables instead of events for the relevant probability 
assessments, there typically remains a dependence on time, and 
hence continuity. In my original copy of Glynn’s “A Probabilistic 
Analysis of Causation,” he makes use of a “just before” ϵϵ-inequality, 
but the version published as Glynn (2011) has removed such explicit 
reference to time, opting to express causal conditions in terms of 
conditional probabilities of variables attaining a value.11 Nonetheless, 
a temporal index plays a role in the definition of Glynn’s (2011) 
Revealer of Positive Evidence Set, which is to “include only variables 
representing events occurring no later than tE” (p. 358, my italics). 
And in his discussion of the “Hiker Ducking Boulder” example, Glynn 
proceeds by “interpolating a variable” along the route of the boulder 
by which time it is too late for the Hiker to duck (p. 382). That one can 
(and must at times) interpolate such a variable defined in terms of 
time reveals that the temporal index and its attendant continuity 
issues are still present in such accounts despite the use of “variables 
attaining values” instead of events with temporal indices. 
 
In summary, if chance trajectories cannot be assumed to be 
continuous, accounts of causation may be undercut by rendering the 
chance around the times of interest potentially “unstable” in the sense 
of jumping between values that may or may not preserve the relevant 
features of the probabilistic analysis—typically probability increases in 
the presence of the putative cause expressed in the form of an 
inequality. 
 
3.4 Neither Continuous Nor Discontinuous 
 
I hope at this point to have made a case for a “continuity bind” 
in how one understands probability trajectories in the context of 
chance. The above considerations push both toward and away from 
discontinuities in chance trajectories; there are pressing needs for both 
continuity and discontinuity. In particular: 
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• requiring systematic discontinuities like (DJP) or (CDJP) is 
problematic, 
 
• requiring continuous probability trajectories is too restrictive, 
and yet 
 
• probabilistic causal analyses require some continuity 
assumptions. 
 
I now consider how an imprecise account of chance trajectories may 
be able to help with this bind. 
 
4 Interval-Valued Imprecise Probability 
Trajectories 
 
In section I present the theory of interval-valued functions and 
discuss their ordering and continuity properties, which will prove 
important in the next section. The idea behind an “imprecise 
probability” is that probability ought to be measured by something 
other than a point value, and the natural choice is a set of values from 
ℝ[0,1]. Often the sets of values are assumed to be closed intervals, as 
opposed to more general sets of numbers, because intervals naturally 
capture uncertainty with respect to a precise value that is often 
assumed to be lurking behind our ignorance.12 Additionally, intervals 
have a structure that makes them simpler to deal with than 
generalized sets. I too will focus on closed intervals here, though most 
of what I will say has a straightforward extension to generalized sets. 
 
4.1 Interval Analysis Basics 
 
My concern here is not so much with issues internal to imprecise 
probabilities themselves, but rather with how an imprecise (interval) 
framework might provide a needed alternative to point probabilities 
with respect to the temporal evolution of chance. Thus, I will simply 
assume that there is in the background an account of imprecise or, 
better yet, “interval probability,” perhaps along the lines of 
Weichselberger (2000). My focus will be on how to think about the 
interval probabilities as they evolve through time. To this end, I will 
deal primarily with the interval probability trajectory of a given event, 
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A as a function, P:ℝ→𝕀ℝ([0,1]) which maps ℝ (time) to the set of all 
closed subintervals of the unit interval, defined by: 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) = {[?̅?, 𝑎] ∣
0 ≤ ?̅? ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1}. This allows the results of interval analysis to be brought 
to bear, especially Ramon Moore’s pioneering work (Moore 1966, 
1979; Moore et al. 2009). 
 
4.2 Ordering Intervals 
 
Deciding on an order relationship in 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) is a problem of 
considerable interest, especially in applied settings such as linear 
programming and optimization, approximation theory, and artificial 
intelligence. The complications stem from the fact that the standard 
order relationship on ℝ, “<”, has multiple “natural” extensions to 
𝕀ℝ([0,1]). For example, Moore (1966) introduces the following 
ordering which preserves transitivity: 
 
[𝑎, ?̅?] < 𝑇[𝑏, ?̅?]  𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓  ?̅? < 𝑏. 
 
In addition to transitivity, this order retains the property from < in ℝ 
that if A<B then there exists a C such that A<C<B. See Fig. 4. Another 
common ordering is an “end point” order: 
 
[𝑎,  ?̅?] < 𝐸 [𝑏,  ?̅?] 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓  𝑎 <  𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?  < ?̅?  
 
A virtue of this order is that it is weaker than <T and still entails that 
each of the end points satisfy the < relationship in ℝ, and it preserves 
the property from ℝ that A<A+ϵ for any ϵ>0. 
 
These interval orderings differ from their real counterparts in 
that they are only partial orderings as opposed to a total or linear 
orderings, that is, ordering such that for all A, B ∈ 𝕀ℝ ([0,1]). either 
A<B or B<A. For example, nested intervals such as  
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Fig. 4 
Ordering intervals with <T and <E partial 
order relationships Fig. 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A= [.2,.4] and B=[.25,.35] are such that neither A<B nor B<A. (See 
Fig. 4.) Within applied work in interval analysis, studies of the 
properties of different orderings is a lively area (Li and Li 2010; Guerra 
and Stefanini 2011).13 For purposes here, the transitive “<T” 
generally will be utilized, though again, how to analyze “less than” in 
the context of interval valued chance should be considered a “site of 
contention.” 
 
4.3 Convergence and Continuity 
 
Convergence and continuity are among the most central 
concepts in analysis—and both of these notions depend on the ability 
measure distance. Recalling the standard definition in ℝ, for 
convergence of a sequence {ai}to a: for every ϵ>0 there is a natural 
number N=N(ϵ) such that 
|ai−a|<ϵ 
 
for all I ≥ N(ϵ). And a function f (x) is continuous at a point x0 if for 
every ϵ>0 there is a positive number δ=δ(ϵ)>0 such that 
 
|f(x)−f(x0) |<ϵ 
 
whenever |x−x0|<δ. The distance function in the setting of real 
analysis is of course the familiar 𝐷ℝ (x, y) =|x−y|, which is a special 
case of the general notion of a Hausdorff metric. 
 
It is well known that the space of bounded closed intervals 𝕀ℝ 
with Hausdorff metric H defined by d(A,B)=max{|𝑏−𝑎|,|𝑏−𝑎|} where 
A=[𝑎, 𝑎] and B=[𝑏, 𝑏] is a complete metric space (Aubin and 
Frankowska 1990). Thus the closed and bounded subset 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) of 
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IRIR is also a complete metric space under the inherited metric 
HIRHIR. 
 
In 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) convergence may be defined similarly with 𝐷ℝ replaced by 
𝐷𝕀ℝ: if 𝐴 = [𝑎, 𝑎] and {𝐴𝑖} = {[𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑖]} then {Ai}→A if for every ϵ>0 there is 
a natural number N=N(ϵ) such that 
 
𝐷𝕀ℝ(𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴) < 𝜖 
for all i≥N(ϵ) A straightforward consequence of this definition (Moore 
et al. 2009, Sec. 6.1) is that 
{𝐴𝑖} → 𝐴 if and only if  {ai)→ a and {ai} → a{𝑎𝑖} → 𝑎 and {𝑎𝑖} → 𝑎. 
In a like way for continuity, a function 𝐹: ℝ → 𝕀ℝ([0,1])is continuous at 
x0 if for every ϵ>0 there is a positive number δ=δ(ϵ)> such that 
 
𝐷𝕀ℝ(𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥0)) < 𝜖, 
 
whenever x−x0|<δ. Again it is straightforward consequence that if 
𝐹(𝑥) = [𝐹(𝑥), 𝐹(𝑥)] then at 𝑥 ∈ ℝ 
 
𝐹(𝑥)is continuous if and only if 𝐹(𝑥) and 𝐹(𝑥) are continuous.  
 
As is the case with point functions in ℝ, F’s continuity at x0 is 
equivalent to 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑥→𝑥0
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐹(𝑥0) see e.g., Flores-Franulic et al. (2013, 
1460). 
 
This inherited “ordinary” continuity for interval-valued functions 
is so tightly tied to the continuity of the real-valued endpoint functions 
that it will not be of use here, since it consequently inherits directly the 
ordinary version’s incompatibility with any “jumpiness.” Thus no 
additional “maneuvering room” is gained to help work free of the 
continuity bind. Fortunately, other conceptions of continuity are 
possible. Below I consider weaker notions of continuity for interval 
functions that preserve crucial aspects of the notion without entailing 
ordinary continuity. This will free analyses based on interval probability 
trajectories from the dichotomous continuity of precise probability 
settings. 
 
5 Specialized Continuity for IP Trajectories 
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Given that different notions of continuity for interval functions 
are possible, how should one arrive at one appropriate for IP 
trajectories understood as functions of the form 𝐹: ℝ → 𝕀ℝ([0,1])? 
Recalling the continuity bind for point-valued trajectories, any such 
requirement ought to: 
 
• stabilize inequality claims between causally salient probability 
trajectories, 
• retain the possibility of “jumpiness” to capture quantum or other 
theoretically motivated “discontinuity,” 
 
• not be so restrictive as to decide substantive philosophical or 
empirical questions by definition. 
 
That there is no requirement satisfying these three desiderata in 
the context of point-valued functions is what gives rise to the 
continuity bind, and as we have seen, the inherited ordinary version of 
continuity in the context of interval-valued functions will not work 
either. Thus, a weaker specialized IP continuity must be found that 
allows for the endpoint functions, 𝐹 and  𝐹 to be discontinuous in the 
ordinary sense. 
 
At this point there are two general strategies for broadening the 
ordinary notion of continuity for IP functions: 
 
1. Focus first on more general set-valued functions (of which 
interval-valued functions are a special case) and then apply 
such general insights to develop a distinct kind of continuity for 
interval-valued functions, or 
 
2. Focus first on the general functional space of interval-valued 
functions, and then explore the properties of particular 
subspaces of interval-valued functions generated by weaker 
notions of continuity. 
  
In what follows, I primarily employ the first strategy, though I 
briefly discuss the second in Sect. 5.3. 
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5.1 Set-Valued Analysis and Continuity 
 
Once one generalizes functions to entities more complicated 
than point-values and their Cartesian products, the ways to theorize 
continuity multiply. I next develop an informal notion of continuity 
appropriate for IP trajectories and then work out a formal definition of 
it utilizing the idea of semicontinuity from generalized set-valued 
analysis. 
 
In the early thirties, Bouligand, Kuratowski, and Wilson 
formalized the notions of upper semicontinuous and lower 
semicontinuous maps on generalized sets with metrics. These two 
notions were required to capture the ordinary sense of continuity from 
real analysis, because in set-valued analysis, the ϵ-δ formulation, 
which requires that arbitrarily small neighborhoods in the range be 
mapped into by sufficiently small neighborhoods in the domain, is 
independent of the (equivalent in real analysis) formulation that 
“continuous functions map converging series to converging series” 
(Aubin and Frankowska 1990, 38–40). Upper semicontinuity formalizes 
the standard ϵ-δ definition as follows: 
 
 
 
Its parallel with the standard ϵ-δ definition should be clear with U 
playing the role of the ϵ-neighborhood and the η-ball about x0 playing 
the role of the δ-neighborhood. To capture the notion of mapping 
converging sequences onto converging sequences we have lower 
semicontinuity: 
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Again, this definition requires that there be the requisite 
converging sequence in Y for any point in F(x0) and any sequence in X 
converging to x0. 
 
It is instructive to see how a function may be upper 
semicontinuous (USC) and fail to be lower semicontinuous (LSC) and 
vice versa. For example, consider 
𝐹(𝑥) = {
[0,1] if𝑥 = 1,
[
1
2
,
1
2
] otherwise.
 
 
This is graphed in Fig. 5. It is USC at x=1 because any 
neighborhood U about F(1)=[0,1] will contain F(x) for all the x in any 
neighborhood about 1 since 𝐹(𝑥) = [
1
2
,
1
2
] ⊂ [0,1] ⊂ 𝒰 everywhere except 
at F(1) which is [0,1] ⊂ 𝒰. And it fails to be LSC at x=1 because there is 
a 𝑦0 ∈ 𝐹(1) say 𝑦0 =
1
4
∈ 𝐹(1) such that the elements of a (any) sequence 
of xi converging to 1 do not have F(xi) converging to y0—this is 
because all such 𝐹(𝑥𝑖) =
1
2
≠
1
4
= 𝑦0. As an example of a LSC function 
that is not USC consider 
 
𝐺(𝑥) = {
[
1
2
,
1
2
] if𝑥 = 1,
[0,1] otherwise.
  
 
This is graphed in Fig. 6. It is LSC at x=1 because only 
1
2
 is in 
G(1) and every 𝑥𝑖 ≠ 1 has 
1
2
∈ 𝐺(𝑥𝑖), so for every sequence of xi 
converging to 1, 𝑦𝑖 =
1
2
∈ 𝐺(𝑥𝑖) is such that yi converges to 
1
2
. It is not 
USC because the small neighborhood about 
1
2
∈ 𝐺(1) given by (.4, .6) is 
such that any neighborhood about 1 has an x in it such that 𝐺(𝑥) =
[0,1] ⊄ (.4, .6). 
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Fig. 5 
Graph of upper but not lower semicontinuous function 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 
Graph of lower but not upper semicontinuous function 
 
With the notions of USC and LSC in hand, the ordinary notion of 
continuity for set-valued functions can then be defined as: 
 
 
Now once again this ordinary continuity for set-valued functions 
is (as intended by its developers) tightly tied to continuity for real-
valued functions, in particular, it brings together in the set-valued 
context the ϵ-δ definition and the “converging sequences” definition. 
So, for purposes here, which involve working out weaker, less 
dichotomous notions of continuity, the ordinary conception is 
unhelpful. There is now, however, a clear way forward by which to 
open up such room, namely, by not requiring both lower and upper 
semicontinuity. 
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5.2 A Proposal: “Gapless” Interval Functions 
 
With the formal tools now in place to explore weaker variations 
of continuity, it will be helpful to reconsider desiderata for continuity 
for IP trajectories. First, such continuity should preserve the possibility 
of “jumps” in chances because some causal and quantum phenomena 
may be such that the intervals representing the chance of effects 
“jump” discontinuously. But chance at a given moment need not (and 
perhaps should not) be “completely disconnected” from chance 
temporally near by. That is, given the interdependent nature of 
events, both in kind (causal and constitutive) and level (micro, meso, 
macro), chances are not “completely disconnected” from one moment 
to another. So while the chance interval of an event evolves through 
time, perhaps “jumping” (discontinuously), it should at no point in 
time “jump” in such a way that there is an actual gap between the 
chance intervals. Call this the: 
 
 
The idea is to rule out cases like that of Fig. 7 below, while still 
allowing discontinuous IP trajectories as in Fig. 8. A bit more precisely, 
the idea behind this is that while the chance intervals [𝑃(𝑡), 𝑃(𝑡)]may be 
discontinuous, they should not be “jumping” in a way that there is a 
time 𝑡𝑥 such that the chance interval at that time [𝑃(𝑡𝑥), 𝑃(𝑡𝑥)]is bound 
away from chance intervals at times arbitrarily close to 𝑡𝑥 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 
Interval function with "gap" discontinuity 
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Fig. 8 
Interval function with "non-gap" discontinuity 
 
An alternative way of fleshing out the requirement that chance 
at a given moment should not be completely disconnected from chance 
temporally near by is that there is always an “unbroken” (continuous) 
path through the graph of the temporally evolving chance intervals. 
Call this the: 
 
 
In other words, P should not be “jumping” in a way that rules 
out the possibility that there could be at each time t in the domain of P 
a value ct contained in the chance interval [𝑃(𝑡), 𝑃(𝑡)]such that the 
function, 𝑣: ℝ → ℝ, defined as 𝑣(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡is itself continuous. 
 
As will become evident below, these are not equivalent 
conditions: gaplessness is independent of continuous path possibility. 
And as is clear from the graphs of quantum-style discontinuities (Fig. 
3), which are not “path continuous” in this sense, gaplessness is the 
better choice in order to countenance quantum chance.14 
 
The way to formalize this gaplessness returns to the definition of 
set-valued continuity in terms of upper and lower semicontinuity. As 
suggested by the graphs of examples of USC without LSC and LSC 
without USC (Figs. 5, 6), both of which are gapless in the desired 
sense, each of LSC and USC are sufficient for “gapless” continuity. The 
proposal is that G(apless)-continuity be characterized as 
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It is clear that if F is continuous in the ordinary sense, then F is 
G-continuous, and the functions in Figs. 5, 6 are each examples of G-
continuity without ordinary continuity. As another more perspicuous 
example of a function that is G-continuous but not continuous, 
consider the following function: 
 
𝐹(𝑥) = {
[0.4,0.6] if 𝑥 < 1,
[0.4,0.7] if 𝑥 = 1,
[0.5,0.7] if 𝑥 > 1.
 
 
This is graphed in Fig. 9. It is discontinuous in the ordinary 
sense (the end point functions are discontinuous) at x=1x=1 and it 
also fail to be LSC at x=1x=1. It is however USC at x=1x=1. Notice 
also that G-continuity is a generalization of ordinary continuity in that 
the point functions in ℝ[0,1] that are G-continuous are precisely the 
continuous functions in ℝ[0,1]. 
 
 
Fig. 9 
G-continuous but not (ordinarily) continuous interval function 
 
Finally, while G-continuity is sufficient for “gaplessness,” it is not 
necessary. There are functions that are not “gappy” but are neither 
LSC nor USC. Consider the function: 
 
𝐹(𝑥) = {
[0.4,0.8] if 𝑥 ∈ ℚ,
[0.2,0.6] if 𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∖ ℚ,
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where ℚ denotes the rational numbers and ℝ ∖ ℚ the irrational 
numbers. This function (graphed in Fig. 10) is not gappy and there is a 
continuous path through it (e.g., 𝑣(𝑥) =
1
2
, and yet it is neither USC nor 
LSC, and hence not G-continuous. While functions like these are not so 
pathological as to to be outside the realm of possible physical theory 
(e.g., they are Lebesgue integrable), there does not seem to be reason 
from physical theory to be concerned with them at this point. Though 
were that to change, there are ways of weakening semicontinuity to 
include such functions. 
 
 
Fig. 10 
“Gappless” but neither upper nor lower semicontinuous function 
 
The approach to continuity for IP trajectories developed so far, 
G-continuity, began from the more general setting of set-valued 
functions. It is worthwhile at this point to examine briefly the second 
approach, one focusing on particular subspaces of the interval-valued 
function space. 
 
5.3 Interval-Valued Function Spaces and Continuity 
 
When the interval functions 𝕀ℝ[0,1]are treated a function space, 
the way is opened to characterize and explore subspaces distinct from 
the the subspace of ordinary continuous functions of 𝕀ℝ[0,1]. The 
subspaces of interest are ones that both properly contain contain the 
ordinary continuous functions of 𝕀ℝ[0,1]but are also still generalizations 
of ordinary continuity in the sense that the only point valued functions 
they contain are precisely the (ordinary) continuous functions in 
𝕀ℝ[0,1]. 
 
In this vein, Roumen Anguelov et al. (2006) develops three 
distinct notions of continuity: S-continuity, D-continuity, and H-
continuity that apply to interval functions. The class of S-continuous 
functions are of particular interest for IP trajectories as they are the 
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weakest of the three. The class of S-continuous functions are defined 
in terms of the lower and upper Baire operators, a corollary of which is 
that an interval function 𝐹 = [𝑓, 𝑓]is S-continuous if and only if 𝑓is lower 
semicontinuous and 𝑓is upper semicontinuous.16 Despite this 
relationship to its endpoints functions, an S-continuous function is a 
completely novel entity from both algebraic and topological points of 
view. Such functions can be quite “jumpy” (discontinuous in the 
ordinary sense) with the primary restriction being that the upper 
endpoint function can only jump up and the lower endpoint function 
can only jump down, and hence do not have the “gaps” of 
discontinuous point-valued functions. 
 
The S-continuous functions are strictly contained in the G-
continuous functions, since S-continuity entails upper SC and hence G-
continuity. But the example of lower continuity without upper (Fig. 6) 
is not S-continuous (its upper endpoint function is not USC and its 
lower endpoint function is not LSC), hence the strict containment. One 
potential advantage of S-continuity over something like G-continuity is 
its connection to continuous functions and the fact that its structure is 
well understood and characterizable in ways that make connections to 
other kinds of continuity. The class of S-continuous functions contain 
the completed graphs of all point-wise infima and suprema of sets of 
continuous functions (Anguelov et al. 2006, 18). Also, S-continuous 
functions can be characterized as the set of interval functions whose 
graph is a closed subset of the Cartesian product of its domain and ℝ 
(Anguelov and Markov 2007, 280). 
 
In any case, the generalized continuity work based in functional 
analysis offers another viable route for the continuity of IP trajectories. 
 
6 Putting IP Continuity to Work 
 
Having introduced the above more “open” varieties of continuity 
for interval-valued functions, I return now to the original motivating 
concerns for IP trajectories, namely, continuity questions concerning 
occurring macro-level events, quantum discontinuities, and inequality 
instability for probabilistic causation. 
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6.1 IP Trajectories and Occurring Events 
 
The issue of how to think of the IP trajectory P(t) of event A as 
it occurs at time tA raises several distinct questions. The first question 
is whether 𝑃(𝑡𝐴)is [1, 1] or whether it is [a, 1] for some 0≤a<1, that 
is, whether the value is a proper interval with 1 as its upper endpoint 
or whether it is a point interval. A second question is how precisely the 
endpoint functions 𝑃(𝑡)and 𝑃(𝑡)converge to their values, since this is 
left open by G-continuity. These questions undoubtedly depend on 
broader theoretical (and likely empirical) considerations that cannot be 
resolved here, but it is important to note how G-continuity can 
accommodate various renderings of the IP trajectories of occurring 
events. 
 
In the context of the Golf Ball example (Example 1), consider 
the following interval-valued chance trajectory of the events, given in 
Fig. 11. In this rendering, the upper endpoint function jumps 
discontinuously to 1, while the lower endpoint function converges 
(from the left) continuously to a value <1, thus 𝑃(𝑡𝑦) = [𝑎, 1]for some 
0≤a<1. Another feature of P(t) to note is that at tx, when the squirrel 
kick occurs, the value of the chance trajectory “jumps” 
(discontinuously) to an interval that contains both the limit intervals 
from the left and right. An interpretation of this would be, again, that 
the instant of the kick “brings together” the higher chance that ensues 
immediately after the moment of the kick with the lower chance 
associated with the original trajectory up until the moment of the kick. 
This rendering and interpretation involve understanding the kick as a 
point event. And again, this IP trajectory is G-continuous (at tx and ty) 
because it is USC there. 
 
 
Fig. 11 
Graph of Example 1 with IP Trajectory jumping to 1 
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Now consider an alternative rendering, one in which P(ty) is the point 
interval [1, 1] as depicted in Fig. 12. Notice that at tx, when the 
squirrel kick occurs, the chance trajectory immediately “jumps” 
(discontinuously) to an interval that again contains both the limit 
intervals from the left and right, but it remains “wide” for an interval of 
time before (discontinuously) decreasing in size to the relatively tight 
interval it is a bit later in time. In this rendering, the kick event is 
interpreted as a temporally extended event. Finally, this IP trajectory 
is discontinuous in the ordinary sense and still G-continuous because it 
is USC at tx and LSC at ty. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 
Graph of Example 1 with IP Trajectory converging to 1 
 
It should be clear as well that G-continuity can also 
accommodate quantum-style events, namely, ones in which the 
probability of A is r until it happens at tA. There is an obvious G-
continuous IP function corresponding to the situation: 
𝑃(𝑡) = {
[𝑟, 𝑟] if 𝑡 < 𝑡𝐴,
[𝑟, 1] if 𝑡 = 𝑡𝐴,
[1,1] if 𝑡 > 𝑡𝐴.
 
 
The function P is graphed in Fig. 13. Under the prevailing 
interpretations of quantum theory, such an event is “uncaused” or 
“irreducibly probabilistic.” If such events are indeed qualitatively 
different from macro-events, as there is good reason to think, then the 
IP framework with G-continuity is particularly apt because it provides 
multiple ways to formalize the difference, e.g., quantum events 
trajectories take on interval values only at the moment of the event, 
or alternatively quantum event trajectories are G-continuous but fail to 
satisfy the Path Possibility Criterion (p. 17). 
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Fig. 13 
G-continuous Quantum Event 
 
6.2 Causality and Continuity 
 
Recall the “inequality instability” issue from Sect. 3.3, namely, 
that many probabilistic analyses of causation compare the chance of 
an event e conditional on the presence and absence of a putative 
cause c at time t−ϵ “shortly before” the time of the cause and/or 
effect. I argued above that this comparison is typically assumed to be 
stable, that is, that one can ignore the precise ϵ>0 magnitude involved 
in “shortly before,” safely assuming that if ϵ is sufficiently small, the 
values of the chances will be “indicative” of the property of interest 
(the inequality in this case). But this kind of stability can be assumed 
only if the chance trajectories are continuous with respect to time to 
the left of tc and/or te.18 For clarity, in what follows I will focus on time 
te, but the same follows for time tc or any other point between them. 
The general form of the inequality of interest is: 
 
𝑃𝑡𝑒−𝜖(𝑒|𝑐) > 𝑃𝑡𝑒−𝜖(𝑒| ∼ 𝑐).                                (1) 
 
The chances that are of interest are described as being “shortly 
before” the time of the putative effect e because at the precise time of 
e the relevant chances (conditional probabilities) are trivial. If the 
chance trajectories involved are not assumed to be continuous to the 
left of te, then the mere fact that the inequality holds at a given time 
“shortly before te” is insufficient to guarantee that it will hold (to the 
left) in any interval about te. And if the inequality could be “flipping” in 
the neighborhood (𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖, 𝑡𝑒)then it holding at 𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖 is not going to be 
decisive for the causal efficacy of c, since such inequality reversing 
would undercut the understanding that c was decisive in the sense of 
ruling out the possibility of there being further factors that could act as 
“stable screeners” or “neutralizer” or “failure sets.” 
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It might appear that some thinkers are indirectly working in a 
“continuity condition” with respect to such inequalities. Kvart (2004), 
for example, supplements the inequality with conditions that 
effectively rule out reversals of the inequality in the interval (tc,te). 
Glynn (2011) may be seeking to do the same thing by requiring only 
that there be the right combinations “increasers” (supporters of the 
inequality) and “decreasers” (under-cutters of the inequality) in the 
interval (tc,te). But these conditions are intended to make sure (1) is 
preserved (or violated) by holding fixed or allowing to vary appropriate 
causal background factors. This should not be confused with the issue 
I am urging consideration of, namely, that once all of the factors are 
included and the inequality is asserted/denied, it is still asserted 
relative to a temporal index, whether explicitly stated or not, and that 
the decisiveness of the inequality as the “last word” on c’s causal 
relevance is dependent on the behavior of the chance functions not 
just at a point in time just prior to te but also in a neighborhood 
around it—because an interval contains an uncountable number of 
points, but a requirement involving a sequential specification of 
comparisons (Kvart) or the right combination of increasers/decreasers 
(Glynn) can only be effective on a countable (Kvart) or finite (Glynn) 
set of points. Only if such a neighborhood exists can one be sure that 
the probability of the effect (just before it happens) is higher in the 
presence of the cause and that it remain higher until it occurs. Or put 
more intuitively, that the probability increase that qualifiesc as cause 
has “the last say” in the evolution of the probability trajectory from 
some appropriate time before the effect until the time it occurs. 
 
As seen above, interval-valued functions can provide an 
alternative to requiring ordinary (overly strong) continuity. Consider 
the properties of inequalities like (1) in the context of G-continuous IP 
trajectories. Making use of the transitive interval ordering <T, notice 
that for interval-valued G-continuous functions, F and G, the inequality 
 
𝐹(𝑥0) >𝑇 𝐺(𝑥0),       (2) 
 
has implications for the behavior of the functions in an interval around 
x0. In the case of ordinary continuity, one could infer from (2) that the 
inequality holds in an appropriately small interval about x0. While G-
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continuity does not quite support this entailment, it does yield 
something almost as strong, namely that 
 
𝐹(𝑥) ≮𝑇 𝐺(𝑥)       (3) 
 
in some neighborhood (𝑥0 − 𝜖, 𝑥0 + 𝜖) about 𝑥0. The proof of this is 
straightforward and instructive. 
Claim 1w (weak): 
 
 
Proof 
 
The definition of G-continuous requires that the functions F and G be 
either USC or LSC at x0. The four possibilities are (1) both F and G are 
USC, (2) both F and G are LSC, (3) F is USC and G is LSC, or (4) G is 
USC and F is LSC. The proof for each of these four cases is as follows: 
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From this it follows that in the setting of G-continuous interval 
valued probability functions, P(e|c) and 𝑃(𝑒| ∼ 𝑐), if the inequality 
𝑃𝑡𝑒−𝜖(𝑒|𝑐) >𝑇 𝑃𝑡𝑒−𝜖(𝑒| ∼ 𝑐)holds at some time 𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖prior to and sufficiently 
close to te, then one has that it does not reverse itself in the interval 
from 𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖 to te. That is, the inequality is in fact stable in that it cannot 
“flip” in the neighborhood (𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖, 𝑡𝑒), and so can be decisive for the 
causal efficacy of c. 
 
And further, the stability given by (3), translated back into the 
terms of the IP inequality (1) yields that the putative cause c is such 
that the chance of e is higher, given c at some appropriate time, and 
that it remains at least as high (not less than) for some interval of 
time after. This degree of stability is considerably more than is present 
in the point probability setting without a continuity requirement. What 
is more, as the proof of Claim 1w makes clear, it is the LSC cases 
(Cases 2, 3, and 4) that necessitate the weaker result. Thus in order 
to obtain the stronger result (>T instead of ≮T), one could require USC 
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instead of G-continuity’s weaker “USC or LSC”, and thereby ensure the 
full stability of (2) obtaining in an interval about x0.21 This stronger 
version would be: 
Claim 1s (strong): 
 
 
 Thus, in the IP setting, different levels (strengths) of stability 
would be available (depending on the kind of continuity employed) 
that could mediate between the particular needs of causal analyses 
and the kinds of “jumpiness” (ordinary discontinuity) required by 
empirical or other theoretical constraints. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
I hope to have made a case for the advantages of interval-
valued probability in settings where objective chance trajectories as a 
function of time are of interest. In such settings issues of the 
continuity of chance trajectories become pressing: discontinuities have 
surprising and troubling consequences for probabilistic analyses of 
causation and how events occur in time, and yet there is compelling 
reason to retain the possibility of discontinuities in chance’s evolution. 
 
In the imprecise setting of interval-valued probability, the notion 
of a continuous function opens up, and it turns out that there are 
multiple ways to generalize the standard point function definition of 
continuous. This yields kinds of continuity that can both stabilize 
probability inequality claims between trajectories and still retain the 
possibility of “jumpiness” that can capture quantum or other 
theoretically motivated discontinuity. And equally important, having 
such a repertoire of continuity alleviates the need to decide 
substantive empirical and/or philosophical questions by “definitions.” 
 
Footnotes 
1. I will assume that the basic form of these chance probabilities is 
unconditional; this is in contrast to general probability, which applies 
to classes of event and whose basic forms is conditional. I assume this 
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for clarity and convenience only: the continuity issues I deal with here 
are not sensitive to whether the physical probabilities of chance are 
analyzed in the standard Kolmogorovian way or some other way, with 
a different conditionalization and/or with conditional probabilities as 
the basic form; see for example Hájek (2003). 
  
2. As an anonymous reviewer points out, there are other equally 
(perhaps more) plausible ways of understanding the token squirrel 
kick’s effect on the probability trajectory, e.g., it might be understood 
as “immediately” raising the probability if focusing on how it 
“immediately” improves the balls trajectory, or understood as 
smoothly lowering it if focusing on the chance of the squirrel collision 
becoming more and more likely. But nothing here turns on these 
particulars—as long as some sort of discontinuity is plausible in some 
setting, which defensible understandings of some quantum examples 
provide. The intent of the example here is only to illustrate clearly a 
chance discontinuity. The point drop rendering above (following Eells) 
is particularly helpful (though not essential) for my purposes because 
it exhibits two different discontinuities. I note too that since all most 
all (excepting Eells) probabilistic analyses of causation are explicitly 
neutral with respect to the continuity question, the mere possibility of 
discontinuities needs to be explicitly accommodated or ruled out, since 
the possibility itself undercuts such analyses. Both of these points will 
be taken up at length below. 
  
3. A jump discontinuity is one in which the left- and right-hand limits 
exist, but are not equal. The other two possibilities, that the left and 
right hand limits exist and are equal, or that one (or both) fail to exist 
are called removable and essential discontinuities, respectively. The 
essential discontinuity case will come up again below. 
  
4. Eells, for one, does recognize that chance could also be represented 
in a continuous fashion, with the probability continuously approaching 
one from below. But he writes that his analysis does not “pay 
attention” to whether the trajectory is continuous at the time the 
event occurs (Eells 1991, 294, note 6). See Peressini (forthcoming) for 
an argument to the contrary. 
  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.] 
34 
 
5. A possible exception to this might be an irreducibly probabilistic 
(point) event, e.g., whether element U-238 will emit an electron by 
time t. According to prevalent interpretations of quantum physics this 
probability will be bound away from one right up to the instant it 
happens, at which point it will “jump” to one. I discuss this case below. 
  
6. I will not distinguish in what follows between causally and 
probabilistically relevance. The questions of if and how these notions 
coincide is of course at the center of the debate about whether 
causation can analyzed probabilistically. For the purposes of this 
paper, probabilistic relevance is sufficient, since the concern here is 
with probabilistic analyses of causation. 
  
7. It is important to stress that since the argument requires the 
construction of a series of events upon which Y probabilistically 
depends, it most obviously succeeds when there is a space-time 
process leading up to or constituting the event Y, as there is in 
Example 1. And as a consequence, the argument does not necessarily 
apply to certain classes of quantum events, which (under certain 
interpretations) fail to have such probabilistically relevant antecedent 
events; this is as it should be as there is nothing incoherent about 
such quantum-level examples. While there is debate about whether all 
macro-level examples of causation need to have such an intermediate 
process, even accepting a pluralistic view, e.g., Hall (2004), it is 
sufficient for my argument here that it work for the large class of 
macro-level cases (like Example 1) in which there is such a mediating 
process. I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help with this 
point. 
  
8. I note that CDJP does not give rise to any novel problems from 
those that follow from DJP, and in fact may be seen as following from 
DJP, since DJP entails that there be discontinuous “jumps” in an 
event’s trajectory at each moment its “causes” occur. But while 
intuitive, the actual argument to establish this entailment is far from 
trivial; see Peressini (forthcoming). Furthermore, it is important to 
distinguish between the two principles because the rationales for 
introducing each are different, namely causal concerns versus more 
general ontological concerns regarding determinism, chance and event 
ontology. 
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9. Menzies’ account, like Kvart’s, while not explicitly addressing 
continuity, does implicitly constrain discontinuities. He builds on Lewis’ 
(1986) counter-factual analysis in terms of unconditional probabilities. 
Menzies requires that causally related events c and e be probabilistic 
dependent—which amounts to there being intermediate events 
corresponding to any finite set of intervening times between the times 
of c and e such that the actual probability of each of the intervening 
events is significantly higher than it would have been had the 
immediately preceding event in the set not happened. This effectively 
requires the chance function to be monotonically increasing, and turns 
out to be an implausibly strong condition; Menzies (1996) himself 
disavows even an amended version of this theory. As I draw out 
below, the point probability framework and this continuity bind often 
force one to choose between stability in the chance function and such 
overly strong constraints on it. 
  
10. Hitchcock (2004, 414) reports Ned Hall’s suggestion that one 
evaluate the probability of an effect shortly before the time at which 
the effect occurs; Hitchcock also outlines there a related proposal of 
his own. 
  
11. The original version is still available online at 
http://web.mit.edu/gradphilconf/2008/A%20Probabilistic%20Analysis
%20of%20Causation.pdf. 
  
12. The term “imprecise probability” traces back to Walley’s (1991) 
foundational work in the area. 
  
13. Other prominent orderings are center-point and radius less than, 
center-point less than and radius greater than, lower point and center 
point less than, upper point and center point less than. See Guerra and 
Stefanini (2011). 
  
14. Even if the quantum jump from r to 1 at time ty in Fig. 3 is defined 
to be the interval value [r, 1], the function is still not path-continuous. 
Were there compelling motivations, there are ways to accommodate 
such jumps within a path continuous framework, e.g., by relaxing it to 
require only left or right path continuity or by defining P(t) to be [r, 1] 
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at ty and all subsequent times, but as things stand gaplessness works 
equally well without the complications. 
  
15. For example, one may weaken the definition of Lower SC by 
requiring only that one (rather than all) elements in the domain set at 
a point have converging sequences. So an interval function 𝐹: ℝ →
𝕀ℝ[0,1]is Weak LS Continuous at 𝑥0 ∈ ℝif and only if there is a 𝑦0 ∈
𝐹(𝑥0)such that for any sequence 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ  and  {𝑥𝑖} → 𝑥0there exists a 
sequence of elements 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝐹(𝑥𝑖) with {𝑦𝑖} → 𝑥0. 
  
16. It should be noted that semicontinuity for real valued functions like 
𝑓 and 𝑓  is distinct from, though not unrelated to, semicontinuity for 
generalized set-valued functions and interval-valued functions like F. 
In particular, semicontinuous real-valued functions may well be gappy 
in a way that is precluded in 𝕀ℝ[0,1] or more general set-valued spaces. 
  
17. An interesting question for further work is whether the G-
continuity of 𝐹 = [𝑓, 𝑓]is equivalent to [((f ) being LSC) and (𝑓 being 
USC)] or [(𝑓 being USC) and (𝑓 being LSC)], but not both 
of 𝑓 and 𝑓 being one of LSC or USC. 
 
18. I stress that it can be ignored only if P is continuous; it is not true 
that the inequality holds only if P is continuous. 
  
19. It would be an interesting project in itself to recast all of the 
particular idiosyncratic details of the various competing probabilistic 
accounts of causation in term of imprecise probabilities, including 
reassessing each of the examples and arguments they employ. 
  
20. Even when the temporal index is explicitly expressed as in (1) (as 
opposed to placed out of sight within a “variables taking on values” 
approach), as far as I can tell the temporal index is simply “carried 
along,” that is, the continuity properties of chance as a function of 
time are not addressed. I note too that as mentioned above, Menzies’ 
(1989) account does indirectly rule out the possibility of any (and 
therefore any discontinuous) drops in chance, but at the cost of an 
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implausibly strong monotonicity requirement, which in part leads him 
to disavow the account altogether (Menzies 1996). 
  
21. Of course the tradeoff with this move is that it would rule out 
certain kinds of “gapless” functions, i.e., those that are LSC and not 
USC. Recall Sect. 5.2. 
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